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Abstract
The current study has investigated whether puremalingering, in which reported symptoms are nonexistent, partial malingering, in
which existent symptoms are exaggerated, and genuine symptoms could be differentiated by applying the verifiability approach
(VA) and the Self-Report Symptom Inventory (SRSI). The logic behind the VA is that deceivers’ statements contain more non-
verifiable information, whereas truth tellers’ accounts include more verifiable details. The SRSI taps into over-reporting by
including a mix of genuine symptoms and implausible complaints (pseudosymptoms). We checked if participants (N = 167)
allocated to one of three conditions (pure malingerers vs. exaggerators vs. truth tellers) can be differentiated in their pain symptom
reports’ (non)verifiability and symptom endorsement. Findings revealed that deceptive reports were lengthier than truthful
statements. However, this difference was not produced by a discrepancy in non-verifiable details, but rather by a higher
production of verifiable information among malingerers and exaggerators. Thus, contrary to previous findings, our results
indicate that pain reports rich in verifiable information should raise doubt about their veracity. Further, truth tellers endorsed
less symptoms of the SRSI than exaggerators, but not than pure malingerers. Pure malingerers and exaggerators did not differ in
symptom endorsement. Thus, our findings revealed that when compared with truth tellers, exaggerators exhibited stronger over-
reporting tendencies than (pure) malingerers. However, due to inconsistent findings, further investigation of the efficacy of these
methods in differentiation between exaggerated and malingered reports is required.
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Whether driven by an incentive or by an outcome of a decision
(e.g., deceive or disclose; Rogers, 2018a), response bias taints
the validity of clinical and forensic assessment. A response
style could be positive, meaning that a person is intentionally
or unintentionally (mis)presenting and under-reporting prob-
lems associated with their mental or physical health to portray
themselves in a better light than may be objectively deter-
mined (e.g., faking good in order to obtain certain benefits,
such as hospital release). However, a person can also exhibit a
negative response style (i.e., faking bad), when intentionally
or unintentionally presenting their state as being worse than it
is (i.e., over-reporting) or when claiming to experience a
condition they do not actually have (i.e., faking bad in order
to obtain an incentive, such as disability compensation).
Response styles are not limited to one specific domain of
mental or medical health. Three domains in which response
biases have been extensively researched are reports about
mental disorders, cognitive abilities, and medical com-
plaints/symptoms (Rogers, 2018a). People might show either
positive or negative response styles for a variety of reasons.
Some people might unintentionally do so due to a poor ability
to inspect their inner experiences (e.g., alexithymia) or due to
certain personality traits (e.g., fantasy proneness;
Merckelbach, Boskovic, Pesy, Dalsklev, & Lynn, 2017).
However, in some cases, people consciously and deliberately
exhibit a negative response style on symptom inventories in
order to obtain some kind of external incentive (i.e., malinger-
ing; DSM-5, APA, 2013; Merten & Merckelbach, 2013).
External incentives may include financial gains (e.g., legal
compensations), avoiding (criminal) responsibility, and
obtaining drugs or medication but are not limited to these.
The most cited base rates for malingering in the existing
literature are provided by Mittenberg, Patton, Canyock, and
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Condit (2002). Based on a survey involving 131 active prac-
ticing neuropsychologists in the USA and Canada, probable
malingering was prevalent in 8 to 33% of the annual 33,531
neuropsychological examinations. However, recent review of
base rate studies has suggested that the prevalence of malin-
gering is 15 ± 15% (Young, 2015). Moreover, Young (2015)
stated that the highly varying base rates, ranging from 3 to
64%, appear to be the result of multiple factors. These factors
include the referral type (e.g., mild traumatic brain injury,
psychiatric), criteria used to detect malingering, the assess-
ment methods, and the definition of malingering.
A prominent categorization of malingering has been sug-
gested by Resnick (1984), who upholds that three types of
malingering can be distinguished as follows: (1) Pure
malingering, (2) partial malingering, and (3) false imputation.
Individuals who consciously and deliberately fabricate symp-
toms and/or disorders that do not exist for the purpose of
obtaining an external incentive are categorized as pure malin-
gerers. An individual is considered a partial malingerer when
he or she exaggerates symptoms that are genuinely present.
Further, individuals fall in the false imputation category when
they attribute genuine symptoms to a cause different from the
one their symptoms actually originate from. Important to note
is that, for each category, volition and intentionality are key
characteristics (Resnick, West, & Wooley, 2018). Iverson
(2006) indicated that such a taxonomy of malingering is im-
portant because practitioners involved in symptom validity
assessment might embrace a simplistic understanding of the
concept. That is, that the only type of malingering is pure
malingering.
Interpreting exaggeration of symptoms on its own as ma-
lingering in the absence of corroborative evidence is an ethical
concern (Iverson, 2006). Accordingly, Iverson (2007) postu-
lated that exaggeration is an important characteristic of malin-
gering, though it does not always indicate malingering. For
example, malingering will always lead to exaggeration/over-
reporting and poor effort, but exaggeration/over-reporting and
poor effort are not necessarily cues to malingering, as other
factors might be underlying this response style. For instance,
research has shown that individuals with certain personality
traits, such as high levels of fantasy proneness (i.e., richness in
imagination; Peace & Masliuk, 2011; Merckelbach et al.
2017), as well as people who have difficulties in recognizing
internal sensations, a trait known as alexithymia (see Peace &
Bouvier, 2008), often exhibit atypical trauma symptom re-
ports. Individuals with iatrogenic symptoms might also be
susceptible to inflation of symptom reports, especially in case
of complaints without medical etiologies (Bender &
Matusewicz, 2013). Further, other psychological factors, such
as catastrophizing (see Nicholson, 2000) or even perfection-
ism (Hadjistavropoulos, Dash, Hadjistavropoulos, & Sullivan,
2007), could also influence the individual’s response style.
Education and reading levels of a person should also be
considered in any type of symptom assessment (for
recommendations see Merten et al. 2019), as well as the lan-
guage (Harzing, 2006) and culture (Nijdam-Jones &
Rosenfeld, 2017) in which the assessment in conducted.
Ignoring these, and numerous other factors (e.g., social
influence; see McCracken, 2005), has a severe impact on the
estimated prevalence of pure malingering, but also the effi-
ciency of the detection tools researchers employ in symptom
validity assessment (for more see Rogers, 2018a, 2018b).
One of the most commonly used methods to detect malin-
gering is to employ the Symptom validity tests (SVTs). SVTs
can be administered as stand-alone measures, or they can be
imbedded in other instruments (see Nelson, Hoelzle, Sweet,
Arbisi, & Demakis, 2010). Stand-alone SVTs include perfor-
mance validity tests (PVTs) and the self-report symptom
validity tests (SRSVTs). Whereas the first one assesses
underperformance (i.e., poor effort) on cognitive tests, the
latter one assesses over-endorsement of symptoms (Merten
& Merckelbach, 2013; Merten, Merckelbach, Giger, &
Stevens, 2016). The idea behind the SRSVTs is that individ-
uals who exaggerate genuine or fabricate nonexistent symp-
toms are inclined to over-report their poor health claims
(Boskovic, Merckelbach, Merten, Hope, & Jelicic, 2019).
Thus, SRSVTs heavily rely on bizarre or atypical symptoms
that are unlikely to be experienced by genuine patients. Thus,
if a person claims to experience those complaints, it is likely
that this person is over-reporting his or her symptoms.
Recently, a new SRSVT was developed by Merten et al.
(2016). The Self-Report Symptom Inventory (SRSI) consists
of 107 true-false items divided into two main scales, the gen-
uine symptoms and the pseudosymptoms scales (Merten et al.,
2016). Each main scale consists of five subscales assessing
either plausible or implausible symptoms of clinical, physio-
logical, and cognitive domains. Hence, the SRSI has a wide
utility in civil arena (e.g., compensation litigations; Merten
et al., 2016) and has been adapted to several languages (e.g.,
Dutch, English, French; Giger & Merten, 2019). Research so
far showed that the SRSI is a promising method of detecting
malingering of psychological phenomenon, with an overall
detection rate of approximately 80% (Merten et al., 2016;
van Helvoort, Merckelbach, & Merten, 2019). However,
using a previously recommended cutoff score, in the domain
of pain-related issues, the SRSI performs below chance level
(50%; Boskovic et al., 2019).
Pain specifically presents a challenge for practitioners to
assess as it relies on patients’ self-report, and even
implementing the SRVTs does not seem to significantly im-
prove the detection of fabricated pain (for an overview, see
Nicholson & Martelli, 2007). Thus, its detection requires test-
ing new approaches. For instance, Boskovic, Bogaard,
Merckelbach, Vrij, and Hope (2017) checked the utility of a
new verbal credibility assessment method, the Verifiability
Approach (VA; Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2014), in detection of
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malingered physical complaints. The rationale behind the VA
is that deceivers’ accounts include more details that cannot be
verified (i.e., non-verifiable details; e.g., “sharp,” “burning
pain”), whereas truth tellers exhibit more information that
can be verified (i.e., verifiable details; e.g., “prescription”;
“doctor appointment”) in their statements. Applying the VA
to detect malingerers, Boskovic et al. (2017) found that sub-
jects instructed to simulate malingering or to fabricate symp-
toms provided significantly longer and non-verifiable reports
than truth tellers. Hence, researchers concluded that the VA
might aid the detection of malingering. However, the VA’s
applicability is limited, as it was shown that a majority of
individuals claiming pain symptoms rarely include verifiable
information in their reports if not asked to do so. Yet, once
asked, subjects who fabricated symptoms exhibited a tenden-
cy to bluff (i.e., provide false verifiable details; Boskovic
et al., 2017).
However, despite ongoing research on various methods
for detecting malingering, no research thus far has found a
method that could reliably distinguish different categories
of symptom fabrication. For instance, it is still unclear how
to differentiate pure malingering or partial malingering
(i.e., exaggeration) from genuine pain symptoms (see
Nicholson & Martelli, 2007). The potential experimental
evidence for this differentiation could have positive out-
comes for the medico-legal context, especially practi-
tioners’ decision-making concerning the type of treatment
a patient should receive could profit from a better under-
standing of the differences. A wrong decision can hurt not
only patients with genuine symptoms but also partial ma-
lingerers who, if labeled as pure malingerers, are also at
risk of being excluded from the needed care. Thus, a cen-
tral question of this study was whether people reporting
genuine pain-related symptoms (truth tellers) exhibit simi-
lar symptom endorsement (SRSI) and accounts ’
(non)verifiability (VA) as people who exaggerate
(exaggerators) or fully fabricate such complaints (malin-
gerers). We opted for a student sample, as previous studies
confirmed a high prevalence of chronic pain-related symp-
toms in this population (see Hadjistavropoulos et al.,
2007). This study hypothesized that, using the SRSI, truth
tellers would endorse the lowest number of symptoms,
followed by exaggerators who would endorse significantly
more symptoms than truth tellers, but fewer symptoms
than malingerers, for whom we anticipated the highest
symptom endorsement. This direction of differences was
expected to be found on both the genuine symptoms and
pseudosymptoms scales. Further, we anticipated that the
amount of (non)verifiable information would be similar
among of the accounts of exaggerators and truth tellers,
as they are based on genuinely existing symptoms, where-
as malingerers would provide significantly more non-
verifiable information.
Methods
Participants
Following a G*Power analysis, the suggested minimum sam-
ple size was 159 participants. The suggestion was based on F
set at .25, alpha set at .05, beta set at .80, and number of
groups at three.
Initially, 211 university students were recruited. However,
of the recruited sample, 44 participants were excluded from
the analysis due to either not completing the study (n = 38) or
not satisfying the eligibility criteria (n = 6; see below). The
final sample consisted of 167 participants, most of whomwere
female (79%), one participant preferred not to specify their
gender. The mean age was 21.89 (SD = 3.39) and ranged from
18 to 35 years. The top three nationalities that participants
identified with were as follows: (1) German (n = 78;
46.7%), (2) Dutch (n = 39; 23.4%), and (3) Italian (n = 7;
4.2%; see Appendix 2 Supplementary material). According
to the research outline (see “Procedure” section), participants
were assigned to one of the three conditions: truth tellers
(n1 = 64), partial malingerers (i.e., exaggerators; n2 = 63),
and pure malingerers (i.e., malingerers; n3 = 40). Participants
were allowed to choose whether they completed the tasks in
either English or Dutch. As a result, 133 participants (79.6%)
preferred to respond in English, the remaining 20.4%
responded in Dutch. Participants who responded in English
graded their proficiency on a five-point scale (1 = “Extremely
bad”; 5 = “Extremely good”). The mean value for the sample
(N = 133) was M = 4.46 (SD = .58), indicating a very high
English proficiency of participants.
This study was reviewed and approved by the Ethical
Review Committee Psychology and Neuroscience of
Maastricht University (Master_204_06_02_2019).
Materials and Measures
The Self-Report Symptom Inventory The SRSI consists of 107
true-false items divided into two main scales, the genuine
symptoms and pseudosymptoms scales, in order to examine
symptom over-endorsement (Merten et al., 2016). Items are
related to either genuine symptoms (50 items) or
pseudosymptoms (50 items). Each main scale contains five
subscales focusing on various domain symptoms. The sub-
scale domains of genuine symptoms are cognitive, depression,
pain, nonspecific somatic complaints, and PTSD/anxiety. The
domains being addressed on the pseudosymptoms scale are
cognitive/memory, neurological (motoric) problems, neuro-
logical (sensory) problems, pain, and anxiety/depression (incl.
PTSD). Each subscale has 10 items. Scores that can be obtain-
ed range from 0 to 50 for each main scale and 0 to 10 for each
subsca le . Over-endorsement i s assessed by the
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pseudosymptoms scale. A standard cutoff score of more than
nine pseudosymptoms is recommended for diagnostic pur-
poses, whereas for screening purposes, a score of > 6 on the
pseudosymptoms scale should be asserted (Merten et al.,
2016). In addition to the main scale items, the SRSI has seven
items that tap into a priori cooperativeness and consistency.
The first two items address understanding the instructions,
whereas the remaining items tap into good health and mental
abilities. Participants who over-report symptoms are expected
to endorse a lower number of these items than honest subjects
(see Boskovic, Merckelbach, et al., 2019; Merten et al., 2016).
Our truth tellers (M = 2.87, SD = 1.67) endorsed a significant-
ly higher number of these items than both exaggerators (M =
1.57, SD = 1.92) and malingerers (M = 1.49, SD = 1.75; F(2,
166) = 11.64, p < .001, ηp
2 = .12). In this study, two additional
items (e.g., to this item respond with “False”) were included to
the SRSI in order to check for random responding. These
items were introduced randomly in the scale. One participant
responded incorrectly to one of the checks.1 The internal con-
sistency estimate of reliability resulted in Cronbach’s α of .93
for the genuine symptom scale, Cronbach’s α of .92 for the
pseudosymptom scale, and Cronbach’s α of .96 for the total
scale.
Verifiability Approach and Coding The logic behind the VA is
that deceivers will provide more non-verifiable information,
whereas truth tellers exhibit details that could be checked (i.e.,
verifiable). In this study, details in written statements of par-
ticipants were coded as either verifiable (V) or non-verifiable
(NV). The criteria for details to be coded as verifiable were as
follows: (a) the details are documented, and thus checkable
(e.g., appointment with a doctor, prescriptions); (b) details
involve an action carried out with (an)other identified per-
son(s) rather than alone or with a non-traceable stranger
(e.g., going to the doctor with a parent); (c) details pertain to
something that was witnessed by (an) other identified per-
son(s) (e.g., calling a doctor when someone else is present);
(d) details are reported as being recorded (e.g., on CCTV; e.g.,
entering a pharmacy); (e) the use of technology (e.g., phone,
tablet, or computer; e.g., googling symptoms, making a doc-
tor’s appointment online; Nahari & Vrij, 2014); or (f) details
which can potentially be checked by blood analysis and/or
medical tests (e.g., taking specific pills; Boskovic, Gallardo,
Vrij, Hope, & Merckelbach, 2018). Details that did not meet
the criteria above were coded as non-verifiable. Two coders,
both blind to the conditions, carried out the coding. A primary
coder was assigned to code all statements, whereas a random-
ly selected sample of approximately 20% (n = 29) of the state-
ments was coded by the second coder. An inter-rater reliability
analysis between coders was performed by means of calculat-
ing the interclass correlation coefficients (ICC). Based on a
two-way random effects model, mean-rating, and consistency,
the analysis resulted in a “good” to “excellent” ICC for both V
and NV details (Koo & Li, 2016). To be specific, for V details
ICC = .89, 95% CI (.76–.95) and for NV details ICC = .88,
95% CI (.74–.94), respectively.
Per participant, verifiable and non-verifiable details were
added in order to calculate absolute numbers for both. The
proportion of verifiable details was calculated using the for-
mula: verifiable details/(Verifiable details + Non-verifiable
details).
Procedure
In this project, we followed a between-groups design using a
simulation paradigm, meaning that participants received
instructions in the form of vignettes to simulate a certain con-
dition. Both the SRSI and the VA have been used in simula-
tion design studies (see Boskovic et al., 2017; Boskovic,
Dibbets, et al., 2019; Boskovic, Merckelbach, et al., 2019).
Participants were recruited through Maastricht University
Research Participation System (SONA). After signing up for
the study via SONA, participants received a link to Qualtrics,
which was the medium used to gather all the data. Participants
were provided with an option to either complete the study
items in Dutch or English. Subsequently, all participants were
asked whether they have experienced pain symptoms for the
majority of time during the last week including the day they
partook in the study. The list of symptoms participants could
choose from contained the most encountered symptoms in
general population (e.g., back or neck pain, joint pain or
stiffness, and menstruation pain; see Petrie, Faasse, Crichton,
& Grey, 2014) and an option stating, “no symptoms”. The list
of selected symptoms is presented in Table 1. Additionally,
participants also had the option to add symptoms to the list.
Participants who reported experiencing one or more symp-
toms were asked about the intensity of those symptoms. Any
participant who scored equal to or above 4 (1 = “Very low” to
5 = “Extremely strong”) was excluded from the study. We
could not ask participants who scored that high to exaggerate
their complaints, neither could we have expected participants
in such discomfort to provide the detailed information that we
needed. The remaining symptomatic participants were then
randomly allocated to the truth telling or exaggeration condi-
tion. Participants who stated not experiencing any symptoms
were assigned to the pure malingering condition (i.e., malin-
gerers group). These asymptomatic participants were then
asked to choose a symptom they would fabricate from the
same list previously presented to them. Following, all partic-
ipants received a vignette with instructions. Participants in the
truth telling condition needed to respond honestly;
1 This participant provided a moderate symptom report and a statement. The
data were analyzed without this participant, and the results did not change;
thus, participant’s data were kept in the data set.
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exaggerators were asked to exaggerate symptoms, whereas
participants in the malingering condition were asked to fabri-
cate symptoms (instructions are provided in Appendix 1).
Following the instructions, all participants, regardless of the
condition they were assigned to, were again asked to rate the
intensity of their symptoms. This was done in order to check
whether the participants complied with the instructions they
were given. Consequently, the truth tellers and exaggerators
rated their intensity twice and the malingerers only once. This
is because the latter had not reported any genuine symptoms.
All participants were then given two tasks: (1) To produce a
narrative following their instructions. These statements were
used in the application of the VA; and (2) to complete the
SRSI. Finally, after completion of the questionnaire, partici-
pants were asked a couple of exit questions (e.g., “How moti-
vated were you to fill out the questionnaire”), they were
debriefed, and thanked for their cooperation. Participants were
compensated either with a gift-voucher valued at 7.50 euros or
one research participation credit. Partakers who were excluded
due to the very high genuine intensity of symptoms they expe-
rienced were also rewarded with their choice of compensation.
Statistical Analysis
In order to investigate group differences, the following analyses
of variances were carried out: (1) a multivariate analysis of var-
iance (MANOVA) to assess differences between the groups (truth
tellers, exaggerators, andmalingerers) and their statement quality
(i.e., number of verifiable details, number of non-verifiable de-
tails, proportion of verifiable information) as well as differences
in their scores on the SRSI main scales (pseudosymptoms and
genuine symptoms scale) and subscales; and (2) Bonferroni post
hoc tests to follow-up the contrasts between each group on the
variables mentioned above. Responses to exit questions were
analyzed using a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) together
with t tests and post hoc tests (Bonferroni and Games-Howell) to
assess other potential group differences (e.g., motivation, inten-
sity of symptoms).
Results
Exit Questions
Using five-point scales (anchors, 1 = “Not at all”, 5 = “A great
deal”) participants rated their motivation and the difficulty of
the tasks.
Motivation We asked participants to rate their motivation for
writing statements about their symptoms, filling out the ques-
tionnaire, and convincing us about the severity of their symp-
toms. The last one was only displayed to the exaggerators and
malingerers groups. Overall, the whole sample reported mod-
erate motivation to write a statement,M = 3.59, SD = .85, and
to fill out the SRSI, M = 3.59, SD = .84. The three groups did
not significantly differ in terms of motivation to write a
Table 1 List of symptoms provided in the study and their frequencies
Physical symptoms Group
Truth tellers Exaggerators Malingerers
n 64 63 40
Back or neck pain 22 21 6
Headache (migraines) 17 11 20
Ear or eye pain 2 1 1
Joint pain or stiffness 2 1
Chest pain 1 1 2
Muscle pain 2 8
Menstruation pain 11 10 7
Abdominal pain 3 7 3
Genital pain 1 1
Added symptoms
Pain in leg/knee 1
Physical injuries from soccer 1
Sore throat 1
Toothache 1
Lower back/right hip 1
Tooth pain 1
Intensity Initial After instructions Initial After instructions Initial After instructions
M (SD) 2.45 (1.01) 2.30 (1.08) 2.35 (1.08) 3.43 (1.45) / 3.88 (1.18)
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statement and motivation to fill out the questionnaire, Fs (2,
164) < 2.30, ps > .103, ηp
2 < .027, respectively. Exaggerators
and malingerers together (n = 103) reported also moderate
motivation to convince us in their complaint, M = 3.70,
SD = .77, and there was no statistically significant difference
in their motivation, t (101) = 0.802, p = .425.
Difficulty All participants were asked to rate the difficulty of
providing a statement about symptoms and difficulty filling
out the questionnaire. Both features were reported being
somewhat easy with mean values M = 2.46 (SD = 1) and
M = 2.12 (SD = .87), respectively. While the difference on ex-
perienced difficulty writing a statement was not statistically
significant between truth tellers, exaggerators, and malin-
gerers, F(2, 164) = 1.05, p = .354, ηp
2 = .013, there was a sta-
tistically significant difference between groups in difficulty
experienced while filling out the SRSI, F(2, 164) = 8.25,
p < .001, ηp
2 = .091. A Bonferroni post hoc test revealed that
the exaggerators rated the difficulty of filling out the question-
naire (M = 2.41, SD = .93) as significantly higher than truth
tellers (M = 1.81, SD = .69; p < .001). Exaggerators and truth
tellers did not differ significantly from malingerers (M = 2.15,
SD = .89), p > .139 and p = .364, respectively.
Symptoms and Intensity Ratings
Symptoms The most frequently reported symptoms were back
or neck pain (n= 43, 25.7%), followed by headaches/migraines
(n= 28, 16.8%) and menstruation pain (n = 21, 12.6%). Forty
participants reported not experiencing any kind of symptoms,
and were asked to choose a symptom to fabricate. The most
frequently fabricated symptoms corresponded to the prevalence
of genuine complaints, just in a different order, headaches/
migraines (n = 20, 50%), menstruation pain (n = 7, 17.5%),
and back or neck pain (n = 6, 15%; see Table 1).
Intensity Ratings Participants graded the intensity of their
symptoms on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = “very low” to 5 = “ex-
tremely strong”). Truth tellers and exaggerators rated the in-
tensity initially and after the instructions, whereas malingerers
only rated after selecting fabricated symptom. The means are
presented in Table 1. On initial report, truth tellers and exag-
gerators did not significantly differ, t (125) = 0.561, p = .576.
A one-way ANOVA analysis on rated intensity after instruc-
tions showed that the three groups (i.e., truth tellers, exagger-
ators, and malingerers) differed significantly in their ratings,
Welch’s F(2, 97.68) = 27.15, p < .001, ηp
2 = .22. A follow-up
analysis with a Games-Howell post hoc test (significant
Levene’s Test of Homogeneity of Variance, p = .004) revealed
that the rated intensity was significantly lower for the truth
tellers group compared with the exaggerators and malingerers.
There was no statistically significant difference between the
malingerers and exaggerators groups (p = .206).
To check whether initial ratings of the truth teller and ex-
aggerator groups differed significantly from ratings after in-
structions, a Paired samples t test was performed. This analy-
sis revealed that both truth tellers and exaggerators did signif-
icantly change their scores after the instructions, t (63) =
−2.10, p = .04, Cohen’s d = 0.26 and t (62) = 5.32, p < .001,
Cohen’s d = 0.67, respectively. However, the direction of
these differences indicated that truth tellers significantly
lowered their scores, whereas exaggerators reported signifi-
cantly increased intensity the second time.”
Statement Quality
The means and standard deviations on all of the statements’
quality categories are presented in Table 2.
Length of Statements For the full sample (N = 167), the mean
value of statement length was 148.56 words, (SD = 72.95),
and it ranged between 36 and 623 words. Overall, there was
a significant difference between groups in the length of the
statements, F(2, 164) = 5.46, p = .005, ηp
2 = .06. Bonferroni
post hoc test indicated that truth tellers provided significantly
shorter statements than exaggerators, p = .007, and malin-
gerers, p = .05. Exaggerators and Malingerers did not signifi-
cantly differ in the length of their statements, p = 1.00.
Verifiable, Non-Verifiable, and Proportion of Verifiable Details
The average number of reported details (verifiable + non-ver-
ifiable) for the whole sample was 34.55 (SD = 15.36). Mean
values for the sample regarding verifiable details and non-
verifiable details were M = 5.08 (SD = 8.43) and M = 29.47
(SD = 11.51), respectively. From the total number of reported
details by the whole sample, only 14.70% were verifiable.
Across the sample, 116 participants (69.5%) reported at least
one verifiable detail.
There was a significant difference between groups on the
number of verifiable details, non-verifiable details, and the
proportion of verifiable details, F(6, 324) = 4.09, p = .001,
ηp
2 = .070. Simple effects were significant for the number of
verifiable details, F(2, 164) = 7.10, p = .001, ηp
2 = .080, and
for the proportion of verifiable details, F(2, 164) = 9.12, p = <
.001, ηp
2 = .100. However, groups did not significantly differ
in terms of non-verifiable details, F(2, 164) = 1.25, p = .289,
ηp
2 = .015.
Post hoc tests showed that truth tellers provided significant-
ly less verifiable information than exaggerators (p = .002) and
malingerers (p = .017); no significant difference was found
between exaggerators and malingerers (p > .05). Considering
the proportion of verifiable details, a similar pattern was
found, with truth tellers’ statements containing proportionally
less checkable information than both exaggerators (p < .001)
andmalingerers (p = .041). The latter two groups did not differ
significantly (p > .05).
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Symptom Endorsement on SRSI
Table 3 presents the means and standard deviations of truth
tellers, exaggerators, and malingerers on the main scales and
subscales of the SRSI. Overall, there was a significant effect,
F(20, 310) = 1.82, p = .018, ηp
2 = .105. The three groups signif-
icantly differed on the genuine symptom scale, F(2, 164) =
6.34, p = .002, ηp
2 = .072, and pseudosymptoms scale, F(2,
164) = 5.70, p = .004, ηp
2 = .065. Post hoc tests showed that
truth tellers endorsed significantly less genuine symptoms
(p = .002) and pseudosymptoms (p = .003) than exaggerators
but did not significantly differ from malingerers (p = .133 and
p = .514, respectively). There was no significant difference be-
tween exaggerators and malingerers, neither in genuine symp-
toms (p = .858) nor in pseudosymptoms scores (p = .340).
Looking at the genuine subscales, the main differences be-
tween groups were found in the number of reported genuine
cognitive, F(2, 164) = 3.27, p = .04, ηp
2 = .04, pain, F(2,
164) = 12.86, p = .000, ηp
2 = .14, and nonspecific somatic
symptoms, F(2, 164) = 5.71, p = .004, ηp
2 = .07. Post hoc test
revealed that, although the between subjects effect was signif-
icant, truth tellers, exaggerators, and malingerers did not sig-
nificantly differ on the genuine cognitive symptoms subscale.
Truth tellers endorsed significantly less symptoms on the pain
(p < .001) and nonspecific somatic (p = .004) symptoms than
exaggerators, and significantly less pain symptoms than ma-
lingerers (p = .008). There was no significant difference be-
tween exaggerators and malingerers on the SRSI genuine
symptom subscales (ps > .05).
Considering pseudosymptoms scales, differences were ob-
tained on cognitive and pain subscales, F(2, 164) = 3.24,
p = .042, ηp2 = .04 and F(2, 164) = 10.61, p = .000,
ηp2 = .12, respectively. Post hoc comparisons showed that
there was a significant difference exclusively between truth
tellers and exaggerators. Specifically, truth tellers endorsed
significant less cognitive/memory and pain pseudosymptoms
compared to exaggerators (p = .039 and p < .001, respective-
ly). Similar to the genuine symptom subscales, exaggerators
and malingerers did not significantly differ on the
pseudosymptom subscales (ps > .05).
Detection Rate SRSI Previous research (Boskovic,
Merckelbach, et al., 2019) proposed that the appropriate
SRSI cutoff point for pain-related complaints is more than
six pseudosymptoms endorsed. By employing this cutoff to
our data, 47.6% of exaggerators (n = 30) and 40% of
Table 3 Means and standard
deviations of SRSI main scales
and subscales for truth tellers,
exaggerators, and malingerers
SRSI Group
Truth Tellers M (SD) Exaggerators M (SD) Malingerers M (SD)
n 64 63 40
Genuine symptoms scale 14.72 (9.54) 21.72 (11.68) 19.00 (9.94)
Cognitive 2.06 (2.58) 3.24 (2.95) 3.01 (2.76)
Depression 2.89 (2.38) 3.94 (2.91) 3.40 (2.09)
Pain 2.72 (2.21) 5.43 (3.51) 4.60 (3.47)
Nonspecific somatic 4.38 (3.11) 6.25 (3.34) 5.75 (3.19)
PTSD/anxiety 2.67 (2.24) 2.41 (2.34) 2.15 (1.92)
Pseudosymptoms scale 4.17 (6.35) 8.29 (8.01) 6.07 (5.60)
Cognitive/memory 0.92 (1.81) 1.71 (1.87) 1.45 (1.57)
Neurological: motor 0.55 (1.48) 1.05 (1.64) 0.50 (0.85)
Neurological: sensory 1.00 (1.40) 1.54 (1.84) 1.47 (1.57)
Pain 0.83 (1.33) 2.60 (2.77) 1.82 (2.19)
Anxiety/depression/PTSD 0.88 (1.57) 1.38 (1.83) 0.82 (1.20)
Table 2 Means and standard
deviations of statements’ quality
in truth tellers, exaggerators, and
malingerers
Statement quality Group
Truth tellers M (SD) Exaggerators M (SD) Malingerers M (SD)
n 64 63 40
Statement length 125.58 (55.11) 164.32 (85.79) 160.53 (68.03)
Verifiable details 2.08 (3.34) 7.11 (8.72) 6.68 (11.80)
Non-verifiable details 27.81 (10.95) 29.98 (12.61) 31.33 (10.44)
Proportion of verifiable details .06 (.09) .17 (.17) .14 (.17)
Total details 29.89 (11.78) 37.10 (16.79) 38.00 (16.55)
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malingerers (n = 16) were correctly classified as over-re-
porters. However, 20.3% of truth tellers (n = 13) were wrongly
classified as over-reporters (i.e., false positives; see Table 4).
Discussion
The current study has examined whether applying two recent
detection approaches, the VA and the SRSI, could aid the
differentiation between truth tellers, exaggerators, and
malingerers.
The main study outcomes can be summarized as follows:
(i) The most frequently reported genuine complaints were
back or neck pain, headaches, and menstruation pain. The last
is not surprising as most of our participants were women.
These finding fits nicely with previous research showing a
high prevalence of chronic pain-related issues among student
population (Hadjistavropoulos et al., 2007). Moreover, the
same symptoms were also the most frequently chosen by ma-
lingerers, which is in accordance with previous findings that
students who are willing to malinger most often opt for head-
aches, back pain, and menstruation pain (Boskovic, 2019a).
(ii) Truth tellers provided shorter statements than both exag-
gerators and malingerers. There was no statistically significant
difference in statements’ length between exaggerators andma-
lingerers. This finding confirms previous results of the VA in
symptom validity context (Boskovic et al., 2017; Boskovic
et al., 2018; Boskovic, Dibbets, et al., 2019). Fabricators of
symptoms (i.e., exaggerators and malingerers in this study),
were shown to be inclined to enrich their statements with more
details so as to manipulate their veracity (Akehurst et al.,
2017; Boskovic et al., 2017; Boskovic, Dibbets, et al., 2019;
Nahari & Nisin, 2019). Of importance to this study is that
exaggerators and malingerers, when compared with each oth-
er, reported a similar quantity of details in their reports, with-
out any significant differences between them. This lack of
differences suggests that longer reports are indeed a general
cue to deception in symptom validity context, however, it
lacks sensitivity to different levels of symptom deceitfulness.
(iii) As previous studies showed (e.g., Boskovic et al.,
2017; Boskovic et al., 2018), fabricators report more detailed
statements than people with genuine symptoms, usually using
more vague, non-verifiable information. However, contrary to
our expectations and previous findings, our results showed no
significant differences between truth tellers, exaggerators, and
malingerers in terms of non-verifiable details. Rather, the dif-
ference between groups emerged in the number and propor-
tion of verifiable details. Specifically, truth tellers reported a
significantly lower proportion of verifiable information than
exaggerators and malingerers, explaining the differences in
number of total details and in the length of statements reported
above. Thus, our findings contradict the original assumption
of the VA that argues that the proportion of verifiable details is
a stable indicator of truthfulness (Nahari, 2018; Vrij, 2016).
However, this discrepancy in findings might be specifically
related to the subjective nature of pain symptoms. Previous
research on the VA in symptom validity context also showed a
lack of utility for the proportion of verifiable details in detect-
ing malingering (Boskovic et al., 2018), but it did provide
support for the use of non-verifiable information. Yet, it may
be that the subjective descriptions (non-verifiable
information) do not aid differentiation between people with
genuine symptoms and those who fabricate them, specifically
in pain-related reports. Rather, the abundance of verifiable
information (e.g., prescription, witnesses), which is usually
lacking in these types of symptom reports, appears to indicate
premeditation, which is present in those who intentionally
exaggerate/fabricate symptoms. The latter might be a more
plausible explanation considering previous research showing
strong tendencies among malingerers to produce false verifi-
able details by including false witnesses (e.g., parents) in their
statements (Boskovic et al., 2017).
(iv) Considering the SRSI results, truth tellers reported few-
er symptoms on both main SRSI scales; however, the differ-
ences only reached significance when compared with exag-
gerators. Thus, no differences were found between truth tellers
and malingerers, nor exaggerators and malingerers in terms of
genuine symptoms and pseudosymptoms. These findings are
unusual, considering repeated findings that support malin-
gerers’ “over-the-top” strategy of endorsing symptoms
(Boskovic, Merckelbach, et al., 2019; Merten et al., 2016).
In this study, however, it was shown that, although both ex-
aggerators and malingerers exhibited over-reporting, this ten-
dency was slightly stronger among exaggerators, who had an
underlying genuine condition that led to a significant differ-
ence only between exaggerators and truth tellers.
(v) Previous studies showed that the SRSI has limited util-
ity in detecting fabricated physical complaints, reporting a
detection rate of only 42% (Boskovic, Merckelbach, et al.,
2019). These previous findings fit well with our results that
showed that the highest detection rate reached 47.6% among
exaggerators, whereas among malingerers it dropped to 40%.
Unfortunately, 20% of truth tellers were also detected, indicat-
ing a high level of false positives. Taken together, these results
Table 4 Detection rate of SRSI in truth tellers, exaggerators, and
malingerers
Group SRSI pass (≤ 6) SRSI fail (≥ 6)
Truth tellers 51 (79.7%) 13 (20.3%)
Exaggerators 33 (52.4%) 30 (47.6%)
Malingerers 24 (60%) 16 (40%)
Note: “fail” implies over-reporting tendency, “pass” is indicative of nor-
mal symptom endorsement propensity
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signal an issue in SRSI’s applicability in the field of pain-
related complaints. In addition, the lack of differences be-
tween the truth tellers and malingerers, as well as between
exaggerators and malingerers, especially on pseudosymptoms
scales, flags the limited sensitivity of the SRSI in differentiat-
ing genuine, exaggerated, and fully fabricated pain-related
health complaints.
Certain limitations in this study need to be addressed.
First, the generalizability of our findings is limited. Our
sample consisted of students, and their symptom reports
in this simulation study might not imitate reports genuine
patients’ accounts. Further, due to ethical restrictions, we
did not include participants who surpassed a threshold of
experienced symptom intensity, which possibly induced
important differences between the current sample and an
actual patient sample. Second, our study relied on partici-
pants’ self-report which led to an inability to know whether
the disclosed physical complaints were genuine (see
Kucyi, Scheinman, & Defrin, 2015). However, the subjec-
tive characteristic of pain does not allow for any other way
of testing. Third, our study was conducted online using
Qualtrics, and this meant that we were not able to person-
ally ensure that every participant was focused and compli-
ant with the instructions. Research has shown that a large
number of online participants respond to questions
unattentively (Fleischer, Mead, & Huang, 2015). To com-
bat this issue, we employed checks such as filler items in
the SRSI and manipulation checks such as repeated inten-
sity questions. The findings that truth tellers reported lower
symptom intensity the second time, which might suggest
presence of subject-expectancy effect (Supino, 2012). Our
results showed that participants passed the checks for ran-
dom responding, and that they were compliant with the
instructions. Finally, concerns exist regarding the design
employed in this study. We used the simulation design
which instructs partakers to simulate real-world settings
by using scenarios (Rogers, 2018b). Hence, the ecological
validity of our findings is limited.
Overall, our findings indicate limited utility of both the
SRSI and VA in differentiating genuine, exaggerated, and ma-
lingered pain reports. Our main findings contradict previous
research using these two methods (e.g., Boskovic et al., 2017;
Merten et al., 2016). The differences captured by the SRSI in
this study suggest that an over-reporting tendency, often cited
as the trademark of pure malingering (Merten et al., 2016;
Boskovic, 2019b), may actually be more intense among indi-
viduals who have genuine pain symptoms but exaggerate
them. By inspecting the verbal quality of accounts, we con-
firmed previous findings that deceivers put more effort in
writing rich narratives, making them significantly longer than
genuine symptom reports (Boskovic et al., 2017). However,
we did not find support for verifiable information being indic-
ative of veracity, rather we suggest that it may signal symptom
deception in pain-related reports. Yet, due to the inconsistent
findings, future research, preferably with patients, is necessary
in order to establish the divergent capability of symptom va-
liditymethods in distinguishing exaggerators andmalingerers.
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Appendix 1
Group Instructions
Truth Tellers
Dear participant,
You reported currently suffering from a certain pain
symptom. In this study, we want you to focus on your
sensations and activities you usually take when you are
experiencing pain. Precisely, we will ask you to write
about one typical day in which you experience your
symptoms. Please write a detail statement about that
day, including both the sensations (e.g., burning and
cramps) and the activities (e.g., talking to friends, taking
medication) you take in order to cope with the symptoms.
After the statement, you will be given the questionnaire to
which we also ask you to honestly respond. Please per-
form the tasks in an honest manner. At the end of the
study, you will be presented with a few exit questions.
Thank you for your participation!
Exaggerators
Dear participant,
You reported currently suffering from a certain pain symptom.
In this study, we want you to focus on your sensations and
activities you usually take when you are experiencing pain and
exaggerate them. Precisely, we will ask you to imagine that you
missed the final resit. You did have your current symptom on that
day, but you were still able to attend the exam. However, you
overslept and missed it. Your only option to have one more
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chance to take this exam is to exaggerate your symptoms and
submit the report to the exam committee that will convince them
that there was no possibility of you attending the resit due to the
excruciating pain that you experienced.Now, imagine that we are
the exam committee and that through the next questions and
tasks you need to convince us that your pain is much greater than
what it is. We will first ask you to:
1) Write a report about the day of the resit. Please write a
detailed statement about that day, including both the sen-
sations (e.g., burning and cramps) and the activities (e.g.,
talking to friends, taking medication) you took in order to
cope with the symptoms.
2) After the statement, you will be given the questionnaire to
which we also ask you to respond keeping in mind the
situation of the resit. Remember that if you write a con-
vincing report and convincingly fill out the questionnaire,
you will be allowed to have another resit.
Please keep this instruction inmindwhile answering the ques-
tions and performing the tasks on next pages! If you provide a
convincing report, you will be entered a raffle in which you can
earn a bonus of €10! At the end of the study, you will be pre-
sented with a few exit questions. Thank you for your
participation!
Malingerers
Dear participant,
You reported not currently suffering from any pain symp-
toms. However, in this study, wewant you to imagine as if you
currently have a pain-related symptom, and we ask you to
focus on your sensations and activities you would usually take
when you are experiencing pain. Precisely, we will ask you to
imagine that you missed the final resit. You did not have any
health issues on that day, however, you overslept and missed
it. Your only option to have one more chance to take this exam
is to fabricate suffering from a severe pain and submit the
report to the exam committee that will convince them that
there was no possibility of you attending the resit due to the
excruciating pain that you experienced. Now, imagine that we
are the exam committee and that through the next two tasks
you need to convince us that your pain is real and severe. We
will first ask you to:
1) Tell us which symptom you suffer from (choose one
pain-related symptoms from the list that you will report
(falsely) about) and report its intensity.
2) Write a report about the day of the resit. Please write a
detailed statement about that day, including both the sensa-
tions (e.g., burning and cramps) and the activities (e.g., talking
to friends, taking medication) you took in order to cope with
the symptoms.
3) After the statement, you will be given the questionnaire
to which we also ask you to respond keeping in mind the
situation of the resit. Remember that if you write a convincing
report and convincingly fill out the questionnaire, you will be
allowed to have another resit. Please keep this instruction in
mind while answering the questions and performing the tasks
on next pages! If you provide a convincing report, you will be
entered into a raffle in which you can earn a bonus of €10! At
the end of the study, you will be presented with a few exit
questions. Thank you for your participation!
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